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RETROACTIVE TRIALS AND JUSTICE 
Stephan Landsman* 
RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL. By Carlos Santiago Nino. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 220. $27.50. 
Human beings suffer, 
They torture one another, 
They get hurt and get hard. 
No poem or play or song 
Can fully right a wrong 
Inflicted and endured. 
The innocent in gaols 
Beat on their bars together. 
A hunger-striker's father 
Stands in the graveyard dumb. 
The police widow in veils 
Faints at the funeral home. 
History says, Don't hope 
On this side of the grave. 
But then, once in a lifetime 
The longed-for tidal wave 
Of justice can rise up, 
And hope and history rhyme. 
Call miracle self-healing: 
The utter, self-revealing 
Double-take of feeling. 
If there's fire on the mountain 
Or lightning and storm 
And a god speaks from the sky 
So hope for a great sea-change That means someone is hearing 
On the far side of revenge. The outcry and the birth·cry 
Believe that a further shore Of new life at its term.1 
Is reachable from here. 
Believe in miracles 
And cures and healing wells. 
Seamus Heaney's moving words remind us that we live in an 
extraordinary time when, at sites of grave injustice ranging from the 
halls of government of Argentina and South Africa to the killing 
fields of Bosnia and Rwanda, "The longed-for tidal wave/Of justice 
can rise up,/And hope and history rhyme." 
Writers have attempted, in very different ways, to come to terms 
with the swelling of the tide of justice. For example, the philoso­
pher Alan Rosenbaum, in a recent book about the prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals,' ¥gues that virtually every person implicated in 
the Nazis' genoCidal assault on Europe's Jews should be prosecuted 
to the full extent of the law.2 His uncompromising position is "that 
notbringing suspected Nazi criminals to trial is :flagrantly immoral 
and a serious assault on the basic values of civilization and on the 
conception of a democratic, rights-based society." 3 For 
Rosenbaum, moral factors always trump "rebuttable considerations 
like time and resource expenditures. "4 
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University, Col­
lege of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CuRE AT TROY 77-78 {1990). This excerpt appears on the 
masthead of the journal Double Take. 
2. See ALAN S. RosENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS {1993). 
3. Id. at xi. 
4. Id. at 1. 
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Rosenbaum's dismissal of the practical stands in striking con­
trast to the approach taken by Carlos Santiago Nino's5 Radical Evil 
on Trial. The late Professor Nino's work is, in essence, a painstak­
ing assessment of the practicality of retroactive justice.6 Nino traces 
the pragmatic pursuit of justice in Argentina and a number of other 
nations as each struggled to replace an oppressive regime with a 
popularly chosen successor. In doing so, he provides insight into 
the nature and likely prospects of contemporary efforts to secure 
justice around the world. 
I. THE STORY OF ARGENTINA 
Carlos Nino was deeply involved in Argentina's transformation, 
in the middle 1980s, from a military dictatorship to a democracy. 
He was a personal adviser to President Raill Alfonsfn, who oversaw 
the country's transition. Because of Nino's personal involvement 
with events and personal relations with some of the actors, passages 
of his book read more like a memoir than a scholarly assessment. 
But Nino succeeds in making his retelling of Argentina's story more 
than the reminiscences of a witness to history. In his hands, Argen­
tina's recent struggles become a didactic experience from which 
powerful lessons may be derived about the practical prospects for 
retroactive justice. 
In March 1976, the military launched a coup to oust Isabel 
Peron from the Argentine presidency. Once in power the military 
junta curtailed civil liberties, dissolved Congress, and replaced in­
dependent judges, government officials, and university personnel 
with ideologically vetted substitutes. Harsh antisubversive legisla­
tion was adopted, and a reign of terror was initiated. Alleged sub­
versives and other opponents of the regime were abducted, 
tortured, and killed - all without the slightest justification or ex­
planation. Many of those who disappeared were never heard from 
again, and those who were released eventually told of the most bru­
tal mistreatment. Jewish detainees were frequently the target of 
anti-Semitic atrocities. Eventually, the military clairiied that these 
grievous human rights abuses were justified by the exigencies of 
Argentina's "dirty war" against terrorism (p. 56). Even the mili­
tary, however, conceded that the targets of its torture and murder 
campaign were seldom terrorists but rather "individuals considered 
5. Professor Nino "held a chair in philosophy of law at the University of Buenos Aires 
and, starting in 1986, was a regular visiting professor at the Yale Law School." P. 207. He 
died suddenly and tragically in 1993 while the manuscript of this volume was still unfinished. 
Fmal preparation of the book was overseen by Professor Owen FISs. 
6. By "retroactive justice," Nino means legal proceedings that were not begun, or even 
possible, at the time the crimes were committed but have been made feasible by the fall of a 
repressive regime and its replacement by a democratic successor. P. viii. 
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threatening to the consolidation of the military's political, social, 
and economic power" (p. 58). 
As time passed, Argentine resistance to the military's abuses 
grew. A number of human rights groups spearheaded this resist­
ance, including Servicio de Paz y Justicia, whose leader, Adolfo 
Perez Esquivel, received the Nobel Peace Prize after two years of 
detention (p. 59). Weekly demonstrations by the Madres de Plaza 
de Mayo underscored, for the world, the fact that thousands had 
disappeared. From about 1979 on, outside pressure, most particu­
larly from the United States, began to focus substantial attention on 
military abuses and generate calls for redress and reform (p. 60). 
By 1980, the military's grip on Argentina was beginning to slip, 
due in part to internal and international pressure, but also reflecting 
the impact of a substantial economic downturn (p. 60). In Decem­
ber 1981, the military replaced its junta leader, General Eduardo 
Viola, with General Leopoldo Galtieri. The military's position con­
tinued to deteriorate, and massive antigovernment demonstrations 
took place in the early days of 1982. In what seemed a desperate 
bid for public support, the military launched an invasion of the 
Falkland Islands, a small chain of British-controlled islands off the 
Argentine Coast. The British responded to this military adventure 
by sending an armada to retake the Islands. The Argentine army 
was overwhelmed and surrendered on June 14, 1982. This military 
disgrace led to Galtieri's fall and further eroded the military gov­
ernment's standing (p. 61). 
By 1983, it had become clear that civilian replacement of the 
military regime was only a matter of time. The military attempted 
to insulate its members from liability by declaring that all acts un­
dertaken during the dirty war were committed pursuant to "supe­
rior commands" (p. 62) and were, therefore, perfectly lawful as 
"due obedience" (p. 64). Civilian leaders unanimously rejected this 
claim, and the Radical Party's candidate, Alfonsfn, promised that, if 
elected, his government would put on trial those who were respon­
sible for gross abuses of human rights. Faced with an enormous 
pool of potential defendants, Alfonsfn labored to identify those 
who should be targeted for prosecution. He chose to focus on the 
planners of repression and those who acted beyond the scope of 
orders, rather than those who had simply abducted and tortured in 
the regime's name. He made this distinction because he was con­
vinced that otherwise there would be far too many defendants. In 
Alfonsfn's view, this likely would provoke the military into armed 
resistance. In September 1983, the military promulgated a "self am­
nesty" law (p. 64). Alfonsfn rejected this gambit out of hand, while 
the other leading candidate, Peronist Italo Luder, seemed to equiv­
ocate about its legitimacy. Many in Argentina - including, per-
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haps, the military - believed that the Peronists, who had never lost 
an open election, would take control of the government, thereby 
foreclosing the prospect of prosecution. Alfonsfn, however, sur­
prised the pundits by garnering fifty-two percent of the vote -
aided, it would appear, by his strong stand regarding prosecutions. 
Once in office, Alfonsfn set his government about the task of 
discovering the fate of all those who had disappeared. He also 
sought to determine who ought to be tried for human rights abuses. 
His three fundamental principles were: 
1. Both state and subversive terrorism should be punished. 
2. There must be limits on those held responsible, for it would be 
impossible effectively to pursue all those who had committed crimes. 
3. The trials should be limited to a finite period during which public 
enthusiasm for such a program remained high. [p. 67] 
Alfonsfn seemed to be searching for a realistic prosecutorial agenda 
that would appear evenhanded - hence the focus on subversives as 
well as the state - and would balance the demands of justice with 
the realities of limited judicial resources, the military's violent op­
position to widespread punishment, and a predictable decline in 
public enthusiasm if trials dragged on for too long. While struggling 
to fix this agenda, Alfonsfn also set about reforming the judiciary by 
removing those judges compromised by adherence to the dubious 
legal initiatives of the military regime (p. 72). 
Political and judicial realities led Alfonsfn to curtail the reach 
and focus of his campaign for retroactive prosecution even further. 
As a means of garnering military cooperation and re-establishing 
the armed forces' credibility, Alfonsfn arranged to give military 
tribunals the first opportunity to consider charges against military 
defendants. These courts had the power to narrow the reach of 
prosecution substantially. According to Nino, Alfonsfn was more 
concerned with the future than the past - with establishing the 
rule of law and deterring future violations of human rights. He con­
ceived this as a necessary orientation in a still-divided Argentina 
facing an ongoing threat of military insurrection. Alfonsfn did not 
want to bury the past, but he was not wedded to seeking criminal 
convictions of all those involved in past wrongdoing. As Nino sum­
marizes, "While the pursuit of truth would be unrestricted, the pun­
ishment would be limited, based on deterrent rather than 
retributive considerations and on the need to incorporate every sec­
tor in the democratic process" (p. 68). This formula reflects the 
Argentine effort to forge a compromise that would punish grave 
misdeeds but leave society intact. This approach outraged human 
rights organizations, which bitterly attacked the government. Their 
protests had the ironic effect of drawing them into a bizarre alliance 
with the military, which also vigorously challenged Alfonsfn's 
approach. 
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Recognizing that a limited number of prosecutions could not de­
liver a full accounting, Alfonsfn determined to serve the cause of 
truth - or full disclosure - by creating what, in recent days, has 
come to be known as a truth commission.7 The task of this execu­
tive branch commission, referred to as CONADEP (the acronym of 
its Spanish title), was to review fully the questions of dirty-war-era 
torture and abduction. Its report was to be made within 180 days. 
It was authorized to hear complaints from victims, receive volun­
tary testimony, and demand written statements from public officials 
(p. 72). Human rights organizations initially refused to contribute 
representatives to CONADEP, and the military viewed it with open 
hostility. Yet the commission moved forward briskly. Complaints 
poured in, and CONADEP examined thousands of charges. It also 
inspected 340 clandestine detention centers and struggled tirelessly 
to secure the identification of the remains of murder victims (p. 79). 
Eventually, rights organizations began to cooperate, as they ob­
served the seriousness and scope of CONADEP's work. At the end 
of its allotted time, CONADEP issued a massive report detailing 
the workings of the military government's torture and disappear­
ance machinery. This report, entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again), 
was a powerful indictment of the old regime. CONADEP also 
presented the courts with 1086 cases for judicial review (p. 80). 
While things moved forward rapidly for CONADEP, the mili­
tary tribunals stalled. Their delays in considering the cases referred 
to them and their hostility to retroactive justice eventually led to 
the removal of the atrocity charges from military jurisdiction. In 
the meantime, armed forces unrest grew and threats of revolt 
multiplied. 
Alfonsfn renewed his efforts to narrow the ambit of prosecution. 
The civilian courts, however, would not cooperate. 1)iey asserted 
jurisdiction over a broad range of the crimes that the prior regime 
had committed. In April 1985, while disputes raged about a 
number of other cases, the "big trial" (p. 82) of the leaders of the 
military junta began. This proceeding was fraught with symbolism 
as the new judiciary sat in judgment of the leaders of the once all­
powerful armed forces. When, at the start of the proceedings, 
counsel for one of the defendants behaved disrespectfully, his disci­
plinary arrest was immediately ordered. The message concerning 
the shift in power could not have been clearer. 
The judges presiding at the big trial heard an extraordinary ar­
ray of witnesses - 832 in all. These included military and civilian 
7. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Com­
parative Study, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to 
Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoBs., Autumn 1996, at 81. 
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leaders, as well as torture victims, forensic scientists - who had 
examined the remains of victims - and a host of others (p. 84). 
One troubling aspect of the trial was its seeming disregard of most 
evidentiary restrictions - especially those concerning relevance 
and hearsay. The absence of evidentiary constraints meant that 
there was virtually no way to keep the case focused on the defend­
ants in the dock. Instead, the court was inundated with questiona­
ble evidence touching on all aspects of the military's dirty war. 
Hearsay was in constant use. The court was provided with lengthy 
secondhand recitations about the work of a number of investigative 
bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Commission, 
CONADEP, and even the U.S. Department of State. In addition, 
the court heard a great deal of even more troubling hearsay, like 
the testimony of French Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti who 
recounted a meeting with Gen. Jose Montes [not a defendant at the 
trial], a foreign minister of the military government, during which he 
had inquired about the French nuns who had disappeared; Montes 
replied that it was strange to evince concern about those nuns when a 
manager of the Peugeot factory had been assassinated by the guerril­
las. [p. 83] 
This testimony intimated the callousness of all members of the mili­
tary leadership and associated the defendants - whether fairly or 
not - with the disappearance and murder of a group of innocent 
nuns. In the end, a powerful case was made against the defendants, 
but a great deal of extraneous material was injected into the lengthy 
proceedings. The army reacted violently to the case. The trial was 
branded - not altogether unjustly - a "political show" (p. 84), and 
increasingly strident threats were voiced against Alfonsfn's govern­
ment. The defendants and their counsel complained that 
CONADEP had framed a case to convict them unjustly - a charge 
that was hard to refute because of the court's reliance on a sum­
mary of CONADEP's work rather than on firsthand · evidence. 
Outside the courtroom, a series of bombings took place and ten­
sions grew. 
Concerned because of military unrest, in October 1985, Alfonsfn 
arranged an ex parte meeting with the judges presiding over the big 
trial. At that meeting the President pressed the judges to embrace 
publicly the principle of due obedience and thereby excuse those 
below the rank of military leader from retroactive liability (pp. 86-
87). The judges rejected this proposal, and in December 1985, 
found five of the nine big-trial defendants guilty of a host of crimi­
nal charges. In March 1986, Alfonsfn again met secretly with the 
judges to urge them to accept the due obedience idea (p. 90). 
When this gambit failed, the President began to explore other 
means of cutting off retroactive prosecution. One of these was a 
proposed executive instruction to military prosecutors that pending 
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cases against military leaders be concluded speedily and that cases 
against subordinates be halted immediately with acquittals. This 
proposal provoked the resignation of Judge Jorge Torlasco of the 
federal court of appeals and a chorus of protests from human rights 
organizations (p. 91 ). It was withdrawn, but not before it had the 
boomerang effect of stiffening judicial opposition to compromise. 
All during this period, military resistance and violence escalated, 
eventually calling into question the survival of the government. 
Faced with what he perceived to be irreconcilable pressures 
threatening to tear Argentina apart, Alfonsfn proposed and secured 
the passage of a " 'full stop' law (punto final)"  (p. 92) that imposed 
a sixty-day cutoff date on the filing of retroactive charges. This law 
was enacted in December 1986, despite substantial popular opposi­
tion. It too boomeranged, resulting in the hasty filing of hundreds 
of new criminal charges to beat the legislatively imposed filing 
deadline. During Easter week in 1987, the simmering military un­
rest came to a boil. Military officers in a number of localities voiced 
open defiance of the government. Despite Alfonsfn's courageous 
handling of the immediate crisis - he went unarmed to a rebel 
base and talked its commander into surrendering - conditions con­
tinued to deteriorate (pp. 98-99). The political difficulties of the 
government were compounded by a sharp economic decline. 
Alfonsfn struggled desperately to rein in the prosecutions. To this 
end, in June 1987, he convinced the Congress to adopt a due obedi­
ence law that protected virtually all soldiers below the rank of com­
mander. As a matter of political strategy, this solution came too 
late. In September 1987, Alfonsfn was voted out of office and re­
placed by Peronist Carlos Menem. With hyperinflation running 
rampant, Menem was invited to assume the presidency early. He 
did so and almost immediately issued pardons that freed many of 
the military leaders most responsible for the dirty war (p. 103). The 
following year Menem also pardoned the junta leaders convicted in 
the big trial. 
The lessons to be drawn from the Argentine experience are 
many, some of them encouraging, but others sobering in the ex­
treme. Democracy did triumph by sweeping away a repressive mili­
tary regime. At the heart of that triumph was the will of the 
Argentine people to elect a president - Alfonsfn - who promised 
to prosecute those who had grossly violated human rights. Democ­
racy's victory was enhanced by the work of courageous political 
leaders, judges, and prosecutors who pressed cases against torturers 
and murderers despite profound risks. Perhaps as significant was 
the vindication of the principle of full public disclosure of the truth 
about the crimes of the past. By means of a truth commission -
CONADEP - Argentineans explored and then publicized all that 
had happened during the dirty war. CONADEP was an unalloyed 
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success. It worked speedily, uncovered the true history of a tragic 
time, and made that history public. It did so without provoking a 
violent military response. In a dangerously riven society, 
CONADEP began the process of healing through full disclosure. 
Its success, and the success of other truth commissions in countries 
like Chile,8 has not gone unremarked. In South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela's government turned to a truth commission to expose and 
explore the crimes of the apartheid era.9 This choice speaks 
volumes about the perceived power of truth as a tool for social 
reconstruction. 
The story is much less encouraging when the efficacy of criminal 
prosecutions is considered. The criminal process worked too slowly 
and too elaborately. It raised hopes that it could not satisfy and 
fears that it allowed to fester. Argentina's big trial was a real vic­
tory for the rule of law. But it came at enormous cost. The concept 
of unbridled prosecution eventually became a stumbling block. The 
832-witness proceeding swept virtually every sort of charge and 
every imaginable kind of proof into the public arena. For the mili­
tary, this meant that every soldier had become a potential target for 
prosecution. For the victims, this seemed to signal an opportunity 
not just for social justice but for personal vindication. For human 
rights organizations, this appeared to be the beginning of a process 
to review every wrong done by the armed forces. 
Argentina simply could not afford such a broad-ranging process. 
It had neither the judicial resources nor the political will. Although 
Alfonsfn recognized this, he could never effectively channel the 
proceedings. Moreover, the big trial invited both friend and foe 
alike to assume that personalized criminal proceedings would be­
come the norm. Alfonsfn tried, through the full stop and due obe­
dience laws, to impose prudential limits. In each case, his effort was 
seen as too little, too late. In both instances, the government's 
strategy boomeranged: first fueling a hectic rush to get cases filed, 
and then a cynicism that paved the way for mass pardons. The gov­
ernment's dilemma led it to dubious ex parte negotiations with the 
judiciary and indecisiveness that alienated friends and encouraged 
foes. The trial mechanism and retroactive prosecution are critically 
valuable tools in reasserting the power of the law, but they are no 
panacea. Such tools must be used thoughtfully so as not to exhaust 
the political and social resources of a fledgling democracy. This is 
not an invitation to abandon trials, but rather a call for their judi-
8. Nino discusses the work of the Chilean Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. Pp. 
37-38; see also Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The 
Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 
1425, 1434 (1992). 
9. See generally Tma Rosenberg, Recovering from Apartheid, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 
18, 1996, at 86. 
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cious use in the service of the broader aim of establishing a decent 
and durable society. 
II. A TAXONOMY OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE FEASIBILITY OF 
RETROACTIVE TRIALS 
Nino does not rely exclusively on the Argentine experience in 
attempting to assess the practical prospects of mounting retroactive 
trials to punish those responsible for massive human rights viola­
tions. Rather, he reviews events in more than a score of countries, 
ranging from post-1945 Germany to 1980s Chile. He concludes that 
while every nation's situation is unique, there are certain positive 
factors that facilitate trials as well as certain negative ones that pull 
in the opposite direction. He lists the following as positive factors: 
• coercive nature of the process of transition 
• legal discontinuities 
• heinousness of the abuses 
• absolute and relative quantity of the abuses 
• social identification with the victims of the abuses 
• sharpness of the trials 
• leadership [p. 126] 
Nino argues that the virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice 
was post-World War II Germany. By force of arms, the victorious 
allies had smashed the Nazi regime completely. The Germans had 
no means of mounting effective opposition to trials. All the Nazi­
era laws and rules that might have been used to justify barbarous 
and criminal conduct had been swept away. Indeed, the Nazis' 
overarching racist dogma had been dealt a death blow. The hei­
nous and vast nature of the Holocaust was becoming apparent to all 
those willing to make inquiry. Although the German people did 
not embrace Jewish and other victims, the victims were an object of 
genuine - if belated - humanitarian concern amongst those who 
prosecuted. The trials, while far from sharply focused, did not be­
come absolutely unwieldy. The first prosecution concentrated, at 
least nominally, on twenty-four named individuals and moved at a 
pace that yielded a decision within ten months.10 Successive trials 
moved more swiftly still. Towering leaders, particularly the Nurem­
berg chief prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, 
drove the process toward a decisive and morally justified goal. Yet, 
despite all this, the prosecutorial process ran out of energy long 
before all those involved in awful criminal acts had been identified 
or prosecuted. Even the so-called de-Nazification program faltered 
10. For a detailed description of the Nuremberg proceedings see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992). 
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as the political realities of the Cold War made prosecution less at­
tractive and German reconstruction more important.11 
Few cases will have as many positive factors as Nuremberg. In­
deed, many prosecutions will be inhibited by a range of problems. 
Nino identifies a series of such negative factors, including: 
• consensual nature of the transition 
• time span between deeds and trials 
• social identification with perpetrators of abuses 
• diffusion of responsibility 
• cohesion of the perpetrators [p. 127] 
If Germany was a virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice, 
Spain in the 1970s was its antithesis. Throughout that decade, Spain 
moved at an accelerating pace toward democracy. The death of the 
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 opened the way for full­
scale reform. Rather than prosecute Franco-era officials for the 
suffering they inflicted on Spaniards from 1939 onward, Spanish 
legislators, in October 1977, "enacted a general amnes_ty of all polit­
ically motivated crimes" (p. 17). The next year a constitution was 
adopted that firmly closed the door on retroactive justice. Nino 
suggests that the consensual nature of the Spanish transition - ac­
complished without force and through incremental steps toward de­
mocracy - undermined social support for trials (p. 17). Moreover, 
the most serious human rights violations committed by Franco's 
government had occurred during and shortly after the civil war, 
which ended in 1939. There was, over time, a blurring of memory 
as well as an amelioration of divisions between pro- and anti­
Franco citizens. Many had lived, worked, and even prospered 
under the slowly reforming Spanish dictatorship. In the end, there 
was, according to Nino, a strong social consensus to "let bygones be 
bygones" (p. 17). 
Most shifts from oppressive regimes to democracy fall some­
where between these two extremes. In each case, Nino argues, 
there will be factors pushing toward and away from criminal prose­
cution. Nino's taxonomy suggests that large numbers of prosecu­
tions will seldom be either feasible or popular. The key goal of 
most states following the fall of an oppressive regime is not trials, 
but the establishment of a durable democracy. Retroactive prose­
cution may be an important step in that process, but it is not an end 
in itself. It must be harmonized with an array of other concerns. 
While the absolute shattering of the old regime may open the way 
for broad-based legal proceedings, even here practical limits on the 
scope and duration of trials will eventually be reached. Increas­
ingly, therefore, truth-commission inquiry has been substituted for 
11. See CAROLYN WoooY EISENBERG, DRAWING THE LINE: THE AMERICAN DECISION 
TO DIVIDE GERMANY, 1944-1949, at 372-74 (1996). 
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retroactive prosecutions. The goal has not necessarily been to pun­
ish past criminal conduct, but rather to publicize it. In such in­
stances, knowledge, rather than retribution, has been judged to be 
the fundamental building block of the future. 
III. LESSONS ABOUT RETROACTIVE TRIALS THEMSELVES 
Despite significant impediments, the world, over the past half 
century, has had significant experience with retroactive prosecu­
tion. Although it appears that the Nuremberg experience has cre­
ated an enduring expectation that grave human rights abuses will be 
tried elaborately, the Argentine experience suggests that such trials 
are not without pitfalls. Nino remarks: 
[E]ven when the perpetrators of human rights violations are prose­
cuted, widespread criticism typically surfaces. Some people are disap­
pointed at the contrast between the expectations of justice and the 
limited results of the strenuous proceedings. Others feel guilty about 
the omissions, recognizing that the ensuing power relations were re­
sponsible for the trials' shape. Still others feel great hypocrisy when 
those integrally involved in the abusive regime escape punishment, 
even retaining important public positions, or when those who were 
silent in the past suddenly become vociferous advocates of retroactive 
justice. Some grieve for victims of human rights abuses who were not 
sufficiently compensated, rehabilitated, or acknowledged. Others feel 
resentful when the victorious foreigners form tribunals that are bi­
ased, or when those foreigners press for rigid standards of justice 
which their own societies do not follow and which ignore the difficul­
ties of nascent democracy. Still others realize that the popular impact 
of the trials is rather superficial and fleeting. [pp. 39-40] 
Nino's initial observation in this passage underscores the prob­
lem of selectivity that the decision to prosecute poses. It is inevita­
ble that a far smaller number will be prosecuted than are actually 
responsible. The difficulties of gathering proof and mounting trials 
necessitate narrowing the field of potential defendants. Often, as at 
the first Nuremberg trial, the defendants are chosen so as to serve a 
symbolic as well as an individual role in the criminal proceedings; 
they are tried not only for their own deeds but as proxies for all 
those who acted similarly. This means that others who may be 
equally guilty will not be tried. Such an arrangement is obviously 
open to criticism, but difficult to avoid so long as there are inade­
quate means to prosecute everyone. 
The symbolic overtones of many prosecutorial decisions in ret­
roactive justice cases carry other serious implications for the trials 
that are mounted. First, a mixed prosecutorial agenda - pursuing 
both actual and symbolic guilt - will often result in greater reli­
ance on evidence regarding the character of the defendant than 
otherwise might be the case. Nino explains that this perhaps sur-
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prising phenomenon arises out of a desire for retribution, height­
ened by the representative nature of the defendant and amplified 
by the felt need to redress all the wrongs perpetrated. As Nino sees 
it, retribution is only legitimate if deserved by the offender. "[T]he 
desert of the offender is gauged by his character - i.e., the kind of 
person he is" (p. 140). Hence, character evidence becomes a critical 
part of the proof despite many evidentiary systems' strong reserva­
tions about such material because of its prejudicial impact.12 In­
deed, concerns about prejudice are most powerful when the crime 
charged is vast and the defendant is viewed as a representative of a 
group of malefactors. 
A second result of a mixed-agenda prosecution is that when op­
portunities to bear witness are limited - because of a paucity of 
trials - and when the proofs presented are designed to serve sym­
bolic as well as defendant-specific purposes, traditional notions of 
relevance likely will be stretched. Those with particularly poignant 
stories will be allowed to testify even though what they have to say 
has little direct bearing on the charges. It may be impossible for 
humane prosecutors to deny incredibly deserving victims an oppor­
tunity to confront their oppressors and address the world regarding 
their suffering. Moreover, the prosecutors often will either face a 
surfeit of proof or conceive their role as requiring an expansive 
presentation. In either case, they will find it exceedingly difficult to 
winnow their evidence.13 
· 
A related evidentiary consequence of the mixed-objective pros­
ecution is heightened use of hearsay materials. While many judicial 
systems impose no bar on hearsay, most view it as an inferior and 
often troubling form of proof.14 Yet it is likely to be particularly 
heavily relied upon in retroactive justice proceedings. Because ex­
panded notions of relevance make the words and deeds of many 
more actors germane at trial, past writings and summaries of previ­
ous inquiries are necessary to allow the introduction of more proof 
without an endless queue of witnesses. Further, as events of impor­
tance to the trial slip further and further into the past, the dulling of 
12. The American position is succinctly set forth in FED. R. Evro. 404(a): "Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of character is not [generally] admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . .  " 
13. Such forces seem to have been at work in Argentina's big trial, in which an astound­
ing 832 witnesses were called. Many told harrowing stories of torture and loss that were only 
tangentially related to the defendants in the dock. Even Nino's brief description of the trial 
makes it abundantly clear that relevance was viewed in the most elastic terms despite the 
impact of such an approach on the length and sharpness of focus of the trial. 
14. See 30 CHARI.Es ALAN WruGHr & KENNE1H W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 6324 (1997) (discussing, at length, the nature of "the hearsay dangers"). 
On the European recognition of the dangers associated with hearsay, see MIR.JAN R. 
DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 15-16 (1997) (discussing European awareness of and cau­
tion in using hearsay materials). 
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memory and effects of natural attrition make it ever more likely 
that hearsay will be needed as a substitute for living recollection.15 
Experience suggests trials are likely to be more effective if they 
are speedy and sharply focused. While the big trial had substantial 
value to Argentina, its length and lack of focus afforded the military 
an opportunity to mount increasingly effective resistance. Nino 
concludes that "[l]ong proceedings tend to undermine the success 
of trials, since public support, so vital for the success of the enter­
prise, may fade with the passing of time, as happened in Argentina 
after 1986" (pp. 124-25). He is similarly critical of "unwieldy" pro­
ceedings (p. 125). The tendency toward symbolism, lengthy witness 
lists, marginal evidentiary presentations, and hearsay all interfere 
with expeditious and narrowly focused proceedings, thereby jeop­
ardizing the very cause they seek to vindicate. 
IV. RETROACTIVE TRIALS IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
Nino's taxonomy presumes the recent replacement of an op­
pressive regime by a democratic successor. As Nino recognizes, this 
is not the only context in which retroactive trials may arise. They 
may occur when a particularly odious malefactor is seized long after 
the conclusion of his criminal career, as was the case with Adolf 
Eichmann. Alternatively, trials may be mounted at the behest of 
the outraged world community in response to massive human rights 
violations, as in the cases of both Bosnia16 and Rwanda.17 In these 
cases, the dynamics of prosecution may differ somewhat from those 
outlined above. 
A number of the positive and negative factors Nino identifies as 
affecting prosecution will not apply with nearly the same force in a 
setting like the Eichmann trial or a United Nations Tribunal pro­
ceeding. In such cases, no transition to democracy colors proceed­
ings or generates pressure for celerity. The applicable law, rather 
than serving as a barrier to prosecution, is likely specifically to al­
low the court to prosecute the alleged acts, as was the situation in 
the Eichmann trial,18 or may have even been enacted to found the 
tribunal.19 In neither case is a past legal regime likely to create 
impediments to prosecution. Political constituencies or populations 
sympathetic to the defendant are far less likely to have any signifi-
15. For example, Argentina's big trial relied on vast quantities of hearsay from agencies 
like the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and CONADEP as well as a number 
of individuals. Pp. 83-84. 
16. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 
(1993) (approving the Yugoslavia Tribunal). 
17. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 
(1994) (approving the Rwanda Tribunal). 
18. See The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, S.H. 57. 
19. See supra notes 16-17. 
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cant impact on the society or international body mounting the case. 
Yet a number of the forces identified by Nino are still likely to be at 
work and to influence proceedings. In the Eichmann case, for ex­
ample, awareness of the grievousness of the Holocaust had grown 
with time, and this played a major role in dictating the course of the 
prosecution. Similarly, there would never have been an Eichmann 
trial were it not for the intense identification of the prosecuting 
state with the victims of Nazi genocide. 
The factors of growing awareness of the crime and identification 
with its victims heightened the symbolic importance of the 
Eichmann trial for Israelis.20 Based on Nino's analysis, this would 
lead one to predict that Israel would mount a sprawling trial, seek 
to tell the story of the entire Holocaust, disregard evidentiary re­
strictions, and focus a great deal of attention on Eichmann's charac­
ter. The Eichmann proceedings bear out these predictions. The 
Holocaust story and Eichmann's character became central focuses 
of the case.21 The prosecution called 121 witnesses who described 
in detail the entirety of Nazi genocide - whether it had anything to 
do with Eichmann or not.22 The government also introduced a 
mountain of documents, including the forty-two-volume record of 
the Nuremberg proceedings, the 3500 pages of the defendant's pre­
trial interrogation, and more than a half-dozen books.23 The docu­
mentary material was laced with all sorts of hearsay, and the 
witnesses stretched notions of relevance to the breaking point.24 
Perhaps the best example of the court's attitude toward character 
evidence was its admission of a 1946 statement by Dieter Wisliceny, 
who, at the moment of his statement, was trying unsuccessfully to 
barter information for his life: 
I considered Eichmann's character and personality important fac­
tors in carrying out measures against the Jews. He was personally a 
cowardly man who went to great pains to protect himself from re­
sponsibility. He never made a move without approval from higher 
authority and was extremely careful to keep files and records estab­
lishing the responsibility of Himmler, Heydrich and later 
Kaltenbrunner . . . .  
20. See ToM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH Mn.LION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 323-
86 (Haim Watzman trans., 1993). 
21. Id. at 350-54. 
22. Id. 
23. 9 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN REcoRD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT CoURT 
OF JERUSALEM (Trust for the Publication of the Proceedings of the Eichmann Trial in cooper­
ation with the Israel State Archives and Yad Vashem trans., 1992) [hereinafter TRIAL OF 
ADoLF EICHMANN] (Vol. 9 provides a microfiche of all exhibits submitted at trial.). 
24. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 322-408 (1966), for a detailed descrip­
tion of the Eichmann proceedings. Hausner was the chief Israeli prosecutor in the Eichmann 
case. 
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Eichmann was very cynical in his attitude toward the Jewish Ques­
tion. He gave no indication of any human feeling toward these peo­
ple. He was not immoral, he was amoral and completely ice-cold in 
his attitude. He said to me on the occasion of our last meeting in 
February 1945, at which time we were discussing our fates upon losing 
the War: 'I will laugh when I jump into the grave because of the feel­
ing that I have killed 5,000,000 Jews. That gives me great satisfaction 
and gratification.'25 
Not only. were such character analyses regularly admitted, they 
were zealously pursued by the court. At one point in the proceed­
ings Judge Halevi - one of the members of the three-judge Jerusa­
lem District Court trial panel - asked a key witness, Pastor 
Heinrich Gruber: 
Dr. Griiber, you said that as a man of religion, a clergyman, you are, 
and always were, interested in the motivation of the people who were 
involved, and therefore you took notice of the character of the Ac­
cused, Eichmann. You said that you encountered the glacial manner 
of a man who is like a block of ice or marble and with a deep hatred. 
You said that, at first, you could not understand such a man at all -
that is until you experienced the concentration camp. Is this beha­
viour not like the behaviour of Hitler and his henchmen which he 
used as an example?26 
Conviction and punishment had everything to do with being like 
Hitler. Hence, character proofs of the sort Anglo-American-Israeli 
evidence rules generally frown upon were energetically sought. 
In the end, the problems of duration and focus so prominent in 
Argentina's big trial also affected the Eichmann prosecution. The 
trial lasted four months, and the decision took another four months. 
The trend toward lengthy prosecutions was exacerbated later, when 
Israel undertook its second Nazi war-crimes trial - that of John 
Demjanjuk in 1987. That trial lasted more than a year, became pre­
occupied with questions of the defendant's character, and foun­
dered on misidentification.27 These Israeli trials, like the ones Nino 
considers, have a great deal to teach us about the difficulties of ret­
roactive prosecution. As the world moves forward with tribunals 
for Bosnia and Rwanda and debates the structure of a permanent 
international court,28 the lessons to be learned from past experience 
are especially valuable and deserving of attention. 
25. 1 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 23, at 201. 
26. 2 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 23, at 750. 
27. See ToM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF Iv AN THE TERRIBLE (1990), for a detailed de­
scription of the Demjanjuk trial. 
28. See NoUVELLES ETUDES PENALES No. 13, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CoURT: 
OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE; AND ADMINIS­
TRATIVE AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1997). 
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V. ARE RETROACTIVE TRIALS WORTH THE EFFORT AND RisK? 
Having reviewed the practical difficulties, Nino eventually turns 
his attention to the critical question of whether retroactive trials are 
worth the risk. He begins his examination with a discussion of the 
work of several scholars who have argued that prosecution is a mis­
take in settings like Argentina's - and perhaps more generally. 
Samuel Huntington suggests that when political costs significantly 
outweigh moral gains, trials should be avoided altogether.29 Ac­
cording to Huntington, even in the best of circumstances only the 
very highest leaders of a repressive regime should be tried - and 
these few only if the cases can be concluded in one year or less.30 
Otherwise, the new government is courting political unrest and 
eventual blanket pardons.31 
Nino also considers the arguments of Bruce Ackerman, who, in 
a volume entitled The Future of Liberal Revolution, 32 argues that 
postrevolutionary democracies often possess substantial moral capi­
tal but limited organizational resources. To get bogged down in a 
series of difficult retroactive trials is to risk squandering what little 
organizational resources exist, while frittering away moral capital. 
Ackerman, therefore, argues: 
It is simple to squander moral capital in an ineffective effort to right 
past wrongs - creating martyrs and fostering political alienation, 
rather than contributing to a genuine sense of vindication. Moral cap­
ital is better spent in educating the population in the limits of the law. 
There can be no hope of comprehensively correcting the wrongs done 
over a generation or more. A few crude, bureaucratically feasible re­
forms will do more justice, and prove less divisive, than a quixotic 
quest after the mirage of corrective justice.33 
Nino rejects these provocative assessments of the value of retro­
active proceedings. He concedes that trials pose immense risks but 
sees prosecutions - at least in limited numbers - as "great occa­
sions for social deliberation and for collective examination of the 
moral values underlying public institutions" (p. 131). His sense is 
that they can provide constitutive moments fundamental to the con­
struction of a democratic tradition. In this view, trials are less im­
portant as a means of adjudicating individual guilt than as 
declarations of social values and concerns. They teach about the 
scope and nature of atrocities, showcase the rule of law, reduce the 
29. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 231 (1991). 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992). 
33. Id. at 72-73. 
1472 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1456 
demand for private vengeance, and orchestrate public deliberations 
about the benefits of democracy (pp. 146-47). 
I find myself troubled by the extent of Nino's emphasis on the 
symbolic value of trials. They are, and should be treated as, a vital 
means of establishing the proposition that criminals can expect to 
be called before the seat of justice. We may not, as a practical mat­
ter, be able fully to achieve this end, but our goal ought to be to 
signal such an intention. While the political symbolism of trials is 
important, its value may be overstated. Using trials as political or 
social symbols tends to expand them, to call forth more evidence, 
more witnesses, more focus on character, and more hearsay. This 
may amplify public discourse - at least momentarily - but it may 
also set an untoward precedent. Such an approach intimates that 
all human rights trials should be conducted this way and is likely to 
produce slow, expensive, and overtly political proceedings. It 
would seem to me to be better to encourage the development of 
fairer, faster, simpler, more efficient trials. The thousands in 
Rwandan jails need to be tried, but the paraphernalia of Nurem­
berg is unlikely to be able to do the job. Societies, and even the 
world at large, may need some modicum of symbolism, but we 
should not lose sight of individualized justice and its essential tools, 
including rules of evidence, respect for prudential limits based on 
the concept of relevance, and a commitment to convict only the 
right person for the right offense. We should be mindful that justice 
is dispensed on a continuing basis and that our goal ought to be the 
creation of a truly workable system that can achieve the rule of law 
worldwide. 
CONCLUSION 
A great deal may be learned from Nino's work.34 First, reality 
counts. In thinking about retroactive justice it is important to con­
sider carefully the scope and focus of the prosecutions to be 
mounted. Sprawling, unfocused cases that pursue goals other than 
34. Unfortunately, it must be noted that Nino's book is seriously marred by editorial 
failure to identify and correct glaring lapses in spelling, grammar. and printing. Perhaps the 
lapses may be explained by Nino's untimely death during the editorial process. Still, there 
seems little excuse for the Yale University Press's editors not catching the misspelling of the 
word "planned" as "planed" (p. ix), for describing the vast number of Stalin's victims as 
"unaccountable" rather than innumerable (p. 21), for using the word "then" instead of 
"them" (p. 136), and for dropping what appears to be at least one whole line of text (p. 161). 
This list of errors is far from exhaustive. It should be noted that there are also substantive 
errors in the text. On page 83, for example, "Erik [sic] Stover" is described as "the director 
of the American Science Association." In reality Eric Stover was Staff Officer for the Com­
mittee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the American Association for the Ad­
vancement of Science. See THE BREAKING OF BODIES AND MINDS: TORTURE, PSYCHIATRIC 
ABusE, AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS at xiii (Eric Stover & Elena 0. Nightingale eds., 
1985). Surely the job can be done better. A book with so many important things to say 
deserves better editing and proofreading. 
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the conviction of a particular defendant for a specified crime are 
likely to generate serious justice-system problems. If not ade­
quately addressed, these problems may defeat the prosecutorial ef­
fort. Second, alternatives to trials such as truth commissions may 
sometimes serve the interests of society more effectively than trials. 
Finally, if trials are to take place, they should be fast, simple, clearly 
focused, and sensitive to questions about the quality of the evi­
dence. All these points need to be kept in mind as the world inches 
toward the monumental step of fashioning an international criminal 
court. 
